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   Rob	  didn’t	  come	  at	  Gray	  Horse	  all	  at	  once;	  it	  had	  to	  evolve	  to	  get	  up	  here.	  That	  meant	  sending	  walking	  scouts.	  And	  some	  of	   those	  scouts	  go	  caught.	  Some	   of	   those	   got	   taken	   apart	   and	   put	   back	   together	   again.	   Gray	   Horse	  Army	  prefers	  to	  fight	  with	  captured	  robots.	  ‘You’re	   the	   one	  who	   figured	   out	   how	   to	   liberate	   the	   spider	   tanks?	   To	  lobotomize	  them?’	  I	  ask.	  ‘Yep,’	  he	  says.	  ‘Jesus.	  Are	  you	  a	  scientist	  or	  something?’	  Lark	  chuckles.	  ‘A	  mechanic	  is	  just	  an	  engineer	  in	  blue	  jeans.’	  Daniel	  H.	  Wilson,	  Robopocalypse	  1	  	  	  In	   Daniel	   H.	   Wilson’s	   novel	   Robopocalypse	   human	   survivors	   of	   a	   potential	   ‘robot	  apocalypse’	  modify	  the	  killer	  robots	  built	  by	  ‘Rob’	  (the	  humans’	  generic	  term	  for	  the	  self-­‐aware	   artificial	   intelligence	   villain,	   Archos),	   so	   the	   modified	   robots	   become	  allies.	   The	   story	   follows	   an	   epic	   struggle	   of	   human	   ingenuity	   against	   the	   cool	  calculation	  of	  artificial	  intelligence.	  In	  melodramatic	  ‘high	  concept’	  fashion	  the	  novel	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serves	   as	   a	   parable	   for	   the	   struggle	   of	   humanity	   against	   ‘runaway’	   technological	  development.	  The	  brief	  extract	  above	  touches	  on	  the	  problem	  for	  Wilson	  of	  how	  to	  represent	   the	   process	   by	   which	   the	   human	   characters	   of	   Robopocalypse	   gain	   the	  relevant	   technical	   skill	   and	   knowledge	   to	  modify	   the	   ‘Rob’-­‐built	   robots	   into	   allies;	  this	  is	  a	  potential	  ‘know-­‐how’	  gap.	  For	  survivors	  to	  be	  able	  to	  modify	  the	  robots	  sent	  against	   them	   they	   would	   need	   a	   practical	   working	   knowledge	   of	   mechatronic	  engineering,	  artificial	  intelligence,	  computer	  science	  and	  so	  on.	  In	   this	   article	   I	   endeavour	   to	   explore	   the	   relation	   between	   experience	   and	  ‘know-­‐how’	  as	  a	  ‘tacit’	  form	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  role	  of	  enthusiasm	  in	  the	  production	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’,	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   transmission	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’.	  Why	   is	   the	  transmission	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  a	  problem?	  If	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	  a	   tacit	   form	  of	  knowledge,	   then	   there	   are	  difficulties	   imagining	  how	   it	   is	   transmitted	   through	   the	  media	  without	  becoming	  an	  ‘explicit’	  form	  of	  knowledge.	  I	  shall	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  the	   humble	   ‘how	   to’	   article,	   as	   its	   primary	   purpose	   is	   the	   transmission	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’.	  My	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  way	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	  developed	  through	   experience	   and	   then	   to	   suggest	   that	   instead	   of	   transmitting	   ‘know-­‐how’	  itself,	   the	   ‘how	   to’	   article	   presents	   the	   conditions	   of	   experience	   through	   which	   a	  reader	   or	   viewer	   can	   develop	   ‘know-­‐how’.	   I	   shall	   draw	   on	   relatively	   complicated	  conceptions	   of	   experience	   derived	   primarily	   from	   Gilles	   Deleuze’s	   philosophy	   of	  transcendental	   empiricism.2	   There	   is	   an	   affinity	   between	   Deleuze’s	   concep-­‐tualisation	   of	   the	   ‘disjunctive	   synthesis’	   in	   the	   dramatisation	   of	   thought	   and	   the	  situational	  art	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’.3	  Those	  unfamiliar	  with	  Deleuze’s	  philosophy	  may	  find	  it	   perplexing,	   but	   I	   hope	   by	   drawing	   on	   relatively	   familiar	   examples	   such	   stylistic	  complexity	  will	  be	  less	  sharp.	  	  	  
Robopocalypse	   is	   set	   in	   a	   near-­‐future	   where	   robots	   are	   ubiquitous,	   so	   it	   is	  within	  reason,	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  novel,	  that	  the	  huge	  number	  of	  consumer-­‐market	  robots	   indicates	   that	   there	  must	   be	   an	   equally	   large	   number	   of	   ‘robot	  mechanics’	  whose	   trade-­‐based	  occupation	   is	   to	  repair	  and	  modify	  robots;	  perhaps	   this	   is	  Lark	  Iron	   Cloud’s	   occupation?	   Wilson’s	   background	   serves	   him	   well	   to	   address	   the	  problem	  of	  a	  potential	  ‘know-­‐how’	  gap.	  He	  graduated	  with	  a	  PhD	  from	  the	  Robotics	  Institute	  of	  Carnegie	  Mellon	  University	   in	  2006	  and	  presented	  a	  television	  show	  in	  2008	  called	  It	  Works	  where	  he	  explains	  how	  everyday	  socio-­‐technologies	  (sneakers,	  guns,	   tattoos	   and	   so	  on)	  work.	  He	   is	   best	   known,	  however,	   for	  his	   series	   of	   books	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dealing	   with	   How	   to	   Survive	   a	   Robot	   Uprising	   and	   How	   to	   Build	   a	   Robot	   Army.4	  Wilson	   extrapolates	   from	   the	   present	   state	   of	   robotics	   research	   and	   presents	   a	  series	   of	   ‘how	   to’	   aphorisms.	   The	   familiarity	   of	  Wilson’s	   target	   audience	  with	   the	  ‘how	   to’	   genre	   enables	  Wilson	   to	  use	   it	   as	   a	   discursive	   tool	   for	   framing	   the	   future	  potential	   of	   current	   robotics	   technologies.	   The	   ‘how	   to’	   text	   is	   a	   form	   of	   popular	  journalism	   that	   seems	   to	   account	   for	   a	   large	   degree	   of	   material	   produced	   by	   the	  creative	  industries	  for	  subcultural,	  enthusiast	  or	   ‘specialist’	  markets.	  Extending	  the	  contemporary	   composition	   of	   the	   creative	   industries	   into	   the	   diegetic	   world	   of	  
Robopocalypse	   presents	   another	   possible	   scenario	   where	   enthusiast	   ‘know-­‐how’	  could	   fill	   the	   ‘know-­‐how’	   gap.	   Similar	   to	   the	  way	   1950s	   hot-­‐rodders	   would	   share	  ‘know-­‐how’	  about	  automobile	  modifications	  through	  clubs	  and	  magazines,	  robotics	  enthusiasts	  of	  the	  near	  future	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  a	  popular	  culture	  organised	  around	   understanding	   and	   modifying	   consumer	   robotics	   technologies	   that	   would	  then	  be	  pressed	   into	  service	  against	   the	  apocalyptic	   threat	  of	   their	  potential	   robot	  overlords.	  Beyond	  the	  ‘know-­‐how’	  of	  a	  future	  robot	  apocalypse	  is	  the	  tricky	  proposition	  of	  situating	  a	  study	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   in	  a	  specific	  historical	  context.	   In	  the	  most	  general	  sense,	   ‘know-­‐how’	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  philosophical	  investigation	  since	  ancient	  Greece,	  with	   a	   number	   of	   classical	   philosophies	   conceptualising	   different	   forms	   of	  knowledge,	  but	  beyond	  these	  focused	  perspectives	  complications	  arise	  because	  of	  at	  least	  the	  following	  three	  historical	  factors:	  1. The	   emergence	   of	   modern	   education	   premised	   on	   the	   distinction	  between	   science	   and	   other	   knowledge	   producing	   practices.	   The	  ‘purification’	  of	  knowledge	  into	  science	  is	  part	  of	  this	  shift.	  2. The	   development	   of	   capitalist	   social	   relations	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	  organisational	  principles	  such	  as	  work,	  leisure	  and	  leisure-­‐time	  activities	  such	  as	  hobbies	  and	  sport.	  There	  are	  further	  psycho-­‐geographical	  issues	  here	  pertaining	  to	  shifts	  from	  agrarian	  economies	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  modern	  cities.	  3. Mass	   literacy	   and	   the	   development	   of	   the	   mass	   media,	   and	   later	  development	  of	  niche	  or	  ‘specialist’	  media	  markets.	  	  	  Each	   of	   these	   long	   duration	   shifts	   introduces	   historical	   discontinuities	   that	  means	  that	   the	   historical	   and	   geographical	   context	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	   very	   important.	   A	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shorthand	  way	  to	  think	  about	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relative	  distribution	  of	  necessity	  and	  contingency.	  In	  ancient	  Greece	  tuchē	  (chance)	  was	   often	   set	   against	   technē	   (close	   to	   contemporary	   ‘know-­‐how’),	   with	   humans	  understood	  as	  having	  the	  power	  to	  ward	  off	  chance	  through	  their	  expertise.5	  Those	  that	  had	  the	  capacity	  for	  technē—the	  technītes—were	  distinguished	  from	  amateurs	  ‘who	  although	  may	  on	  occasion	  produce	   impressive	  results,	   [are]	  (owing	  to	  his	  [or	  her]	  lack	  of	  fine-­‐grained	  skill)	  more	  liable	  to	  make	  mistakes,	  and	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  contingency’.6	   The	   ‘vulnerability	   to	   contingency’	   changes	   in	   character	   across	   the	  above	   three	   series	   of	   historical	   discontinuities.	   Taken	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	  contingency,	   political	   power	   is	   the	   capacity	   to	   stabilise	   contingent	   relations	   and	  control	   is	   performed	   through	   the	   distribution	   of	   contingency;	   what	   Galloway	   has	  discussed	   in	   terms	   of	   protocol	   as	   a	   ‘technique	   for	   achieving	   voluntary	   regulation	  within	  a	  contingent	  environment’.7	   It	   is	  not	  as	   if	  everyday	   life	   suddenly	   involved	  a	  greater	   degree	   of	   contingency	   for	   a	   larger	   number	   of	   people	   as	   compared	   to	   the	  past;	  rather,	  the	  quality	  of	  control	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  distribution	  of	  agency	  to	  the	  relative	   capacity	   to	   ward	   off	   the	   deleterious	   effects	   of	   contingency	   and	   the	  associated	  entropic	  processes	  that	  burden	  all	  forms	  of	  life.	  The	  untested	  hypothesis	  I	  am	  drawing	   from	  the	  above	  set	  of	  assumptions	   is	   that	   individuals	  are	   increasingly	  burdened	   with	   the	   responsibility	   of	   developing	   individualistic	   expertise	   (as	  compared	  to	  collective	  or	  social	  forms),	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  their	  own	  capacity	  to	  act	  in	  contemporary	  neoliberal	  distributions	  of	  contingency.	  The	  embodied	   forms	  of	  knowledge	  developed	   in	   the	  reader	  or	  viewer	  of	   ‘how	  to’	  texts	  rely	  as	  much	  on	  the	  socio-­‐technical	  objects	  being	  engaged	  with	  as	  much	  as	  the	  ‘how	  to’	  text	  itself.	  In	  this	  context,	  my	  work	  is	  part	  of	  a	  much	  larger	  scholarly	  and	  philosophical	  debate	  regarding	  the	  tactile	  dimensions	  of	  discourse	  and	  its	  location	  in	  visual	   culture.8	   On	   a	   diagrammatic	   level,	   the	   ‘how	   to’	   text	   seems	   to	   reverse	   the	  historical	   ‘separation	  of	   the	  senses’	   that	   Jonathan	  Crary	   isolates	  as	  a	  key	  quality	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ‘society	  of	  the	  spectacle’:	  [The]	  sense	  of	   touch	  had	  been	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  classical	   theories	  of	  vision	   in	   the	   seventeenth	   and	   eighteenth	   centuries.	   The	   subsequent	  dissociation	   of	   touch	   from	   sight	   occurs	  within	   a	   pervasive	   ‘separation	   of	  the	  senses’	  and	  industrial	  remapping	  of	  the	  body	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  …	  This	  autonomization	  of	  sight,	  occurring	  in	  many	  different	  domains,	  was	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a	  historical	  condition	  for	  the	  rebuilding	  of	  an	  observer	  fitted	  for	  the	  tasks	  of	  ‘spectacular’	  consumption.9	  	  The	   tension	   between	   representations	   of	   ‘the	   hands’	   (tactile)	   versus	   those	   of	   ‘the	  eyes’	   (visual)	   is	   elucidated	   in	   Bruno	   Latour’s	   investigation	   into	   the	   ‘connective	  quality	   of	  written	   traces’	   and	   the	  way	   representation	   in	   scientific	   and	   engineering	  discourse	   developed	   from	   the	   perspectivism	   of	   ‘descriptive	   geometry’.10	   Latour	  isolates	   a	   similar	   historical	   division	   between	   the	   senses	   as	   Crary,	   but	   from	   a	  different	  perspective,	  focusing	  on	  the	  intervention	  of	  an	  abstract	  plane	  into	  technical	  perspectivism,	  so	  that	  vast	  machineries	  could	  be	  ‘visualised’	  on	  paper	  by	  engineers	  and	  the	  like.11	  	  Another	  scholarly	  discipline	  that	  has	  a	  related	  set	  of	  interests	  with	  investigating	  the	  transmission	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  technical	  communication.	  As	  Miles	  Kimball	  argues	  in	   his	   exploration	   of	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘tactical	   technical	   communication’,	   the	   field	   of	  technical	   communication	   has	   largely	   been	   preoccupied	   with	   an	   organisational	   or	  institutional	  context.12	  Kimball’s	  use	  of	  ‘tactics’	  is	  derived	  from	  his	  reading	  of	  Michel	  de	   Certeau’s	   influential	   work	   The	   Practice	   of	   Everyday	   Life	   and	   de	   Certeau’s	  observation	   of	   the	   historical	   separation	   of	   the	   craftperson’s	   ‘know-­‐how’	   from	   the	  descriptive	  accounts	  found	  in	  formal	  technical	  documentation.13	  In	  the	  introductory	  section	  of	  his	  article,	  Kimball	  suggests	  that	  most	  works	  of	  technical	  communication	  are	  written	  for	  an	  institutional	  context	  and	  aim	  to	  reproduce	  what	  de	  Certeau	  called	  ‘strategies’.	   In	   this	   context,	   strategic	   technical	   communication	   aims	   to	   reproduce	  ideal	  narratives	  of	  the	  ‘user-­‐as-­‐practioner’,	  while	  tactical	  technical	  communication	  is	  produced	   from	   the	   experience	  of	   users	  using	   ‘local	   narratives’.14	  Kimball	   turns	  his	  attention	   to	   exploring	   ‘tactical	   technical	   communication	  of	  user-­‐producers’	   though	  ‘enthusiast	  publications	  and	  their	  surrounding	  cultures’:	  Such	   publications	   are	   motivated	   not	   by	   institutional	   strategies,	   but	   by	  enthusiasm	   for	   the	   activity,	   technology,	   and	   embedded	   communal	  narrative	  of	  the	  subject	  matter.	  Researchers	  could	  examine	  any	  number	  of	  enthusiast	  subjects	  in	  this	  light.15	  	  My	   concern	   is	   ultimately	   with	   the	   role	   of	   experience	   and	   enthusiasm	   in	   the	  production	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  and	  its	  subsequent	  transmission	  through	  media.	  Kimball	  focuses	   on	   the	   function	   of	   ‘narratives’	   in	   framing	   the	   challenges	   that	   mobilise	  enthusiasts	  into	  action	  and	  then	  the	  character	  of	  these	  narratives	  operating	  on	  both	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local	   and	   communal	   registers.	   I	   shall	   focus	   more	   on	   the	   affective	   dimension	   of	  experience	   in	   the	   development	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   and	   what	   part	   this	   plays	   in	   the	  transmission	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’.	  What	   I	  aim	  to	  demonstrate	   is	   that,	  simply	  put,	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	   transmitted	  by	   exposing	   a	   subject	   to	   the	   conditions	  of	   experience	   through	  which	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  developed.	  This	  exposure	  does	  not	  happen	  ‘in’	  the	  ‘how	  to’	  text;	  rather,	   the	   text	   is	  used	  as	  a	  primer	  of	   experience	  necessary	   for	   the	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’.	  
—THE ‘HOW TO’ TEXT AS PRIMER OF EXPERIENCE The	   ‘how	   to’	   text	   is	   an	   apprenticeship	   by	   proxy;	   a	   typical	   example	   leads	   readers	  through	   the	   procedural	   steps	   of	   engaging	   with	   what	   is	   most	   commonly	   a	   socio-­‐technical	  system.	  The	  ‘how	  to’	  article	  has	  a	  weird	  temporality	  as	  it	  is	  captures	  future	  experiences	  by	  providing	  the	  conditions	  of	  past	  experience(s)	  that	  are	  nevertheless	  repeated	  (if	  the	  steps	  are	  actually	  followed)	  in	  different	  ways.	  What	  is	  represented	  is	  ‘this’	   practice	   of	   engaging	   with	   ‘that’	   technical	   system,	   but	   what	   circulates	   is	   the	  ‘how’	  of	   the	  knowledge	  developed	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  doing	   ‘this’	   to	   ‘that’.	   I	  shall	   briefly	   engage	   with	   Jim	   Murphy’s	   Custom	   Car	   as	   an	   example.16	   Similar	   to	  Kimball’s	  examples,	  Murphy’s	  text	  is	  a	  slim	  book-­‐length	  treatment	  of	  ‘how	  to’	  build	  a	  modified	  car.	  It	  shares	  some	  of	  the	  explicit	  concerns	  of	  enthusiast	  magazines,	  but	  it	  sits	  just	  off	  to	  the	  side	  as	  it	  is	  a	  ‘how	  to’	  text	  that	  incorporates	  how	  to	  use	  magazines	  and	   other	   ‘how	   to’	   texts	   into	   the	   practical	   exercise	   of	   building	   a	   modified	   car.	   In	  terms	   of	   Kimball’s	   concept	   of	   ‘tactical	   technical	   communication’,	   Murphy	   treats	  magazines	   and	   other	   similar	   publications	   as	   tools	   to	   to	   assist	   enthusiasts	   in	   their	  endeavours.	  The	   six	   chapters	  of	   the	  book	  do	  not	   actually	   cover	   the	   technical	   ‘nuts	  and	   bolts’	   of	   the	   project;	   rather,	   each	   chapter	   covers	   various	   socio-­‐technical	  dimensions	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   including	   how	   to	   buy	   the	   ‘right’	   car,	   how	   to	   plan	   the	  ‘build’,	   how	   to	   incorporate	   knowledge	   of	   technical	   documents	   into	   the	   practical	  aspects	  and	  how	  to	  reappraise	   the	   ‘project’	  after	   it	   is	  ostensibly	   finished	  (‘or	   is	   it?’	  Murphy	  enigmatically	  asks).17	  The	   key	   passage	   of	   Murphy’s	   text	   I	   want	   to	   examine	   is	   in	   the	   third	   chapter,	  ‘Putting	   the	   Zip	   Back	   In’,	   about	   carrying	   out	  modifications	   to	   the	   engine.	   Murphy	  writes:	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The	   keys	   to	   assembling	   an	   engine	   are	   care	   and	   patience.	   Remember	   an	  engine	   is	   not	   unsolvable	   mystery;	   it’s	   a	   bunch	   of	   parts	   that	   have	   been	  linked	  together	  one	  after	  the	  other.	  What’s	  more,	  the	  people	  who	  build	  and	  repair	   engines	   aren’t	   smarter	   than	   you;	   they’ve	   become	   skilled	   through	  putting	  engines	  together	  over	  and	  over.18	  	  Murphy	  captures	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  multiple	  dimensions	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  in	  this	  passage.	  The	  practical	  act	  is	  premised	  on	  an	  affective	  disposition	  characterised	  by	  ‘care’	  and	  ‘patience’.	   The	   engine	   is	   a	   system	  of	   parts	   linked	   together	   in	   a	  way	   that	   is	   ‘not	   an	  unsolvable	   mystery’;	   implicit	   here	   is	   both	   the	   recognition	   of	   the	   engine	   as	   a	  ‘problem’	   and	   the	   assumption	   of	   functionality.	   Lastly,	   Murphy	   draws	   a	   relation	  between	  ‘know-­‐how’	  (‘smart’)	  and	  the	  development	  of	  ‘skills’	  through	  the	  repetition	  of	  practices	  (‘putting	  engines	  together	  over	  and	  over’).	  This	  brief	  passage	  functions	  as	   encouragement	   and	   is	   very	   different	   to	   the	   strategic	   narratives	   of	   technical	  manuals.19	   Even	   in	   the	  more	   technical	   articles	   found	   in	   countless	   enthusiast	  mag-­‐azines,	  there	  is	  a	  similar	  affective	  tone	   to	  what	  might	  be	  very	  technical	  discussions.	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   brief	   passage	   in	   Murphy’s	   book	   is	   not	   to	   relay	   technical	  information	  per	  se,	  but	  to	  prepare	  a	  subject	  for	  the	  experience	  through	  which	  he	  or	  she	  will	  develop	  ‘know-­‐how’.	   ‘Know-­‐how’	  develops	  in	  the	  body	  through	  experience	  and,	  after	  enough	  repetitions	  of	  a	  given	  practice,	   the	  subject	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  can	  be	  considered	   proficient	   enough	   at	   the	   given	   task	   to	   be	   described	   as	   an	   ‘expert’.	   An	  appreciation	  of	  the	  way	  ‘know-­‐how’	  develops	  in	  experience	  is	  essential	  for	  properly	  appreciating	   the	   way	   ‘how	   to’	   texts	   intervene	   in	   this	   process	   as	   primers	   of	  experience.	  Bert	  Moorhouse’s	  work	  on	   ‘hot	  rod’	  enthusiasts	  indicates	  a	  way	  to	  discuss	  the	  complicated	   relation	   between	   engagement	   with	   socio-­‐technical	   systems	   and	  relations	  of	  experience.	  He	  briefly	  touches	  on	  the	  shifting	  character	  of	  technology	  on	  a	  historical	  scale	  of	  practice	  for	  the	  entire	  hot	  rodding	  scene:	  In	  recent	  years	  on-­‐board	  electronics	  and	  electro-­‐mechanical	  devices	  could	  be	   viewed	   objectively	   as	   commodities	   stripping	   away	   skill	   and,	   indeed,	  dealing	  the	  death	  blow	  to	  the	  mechanical	  basis	  of	  rodding.	  But	  this	   is	  not	  how	   they	   are	   presented	   to	   those	   who	   read	   the	   magazine.	   They	   simply	  
represent	  new	  challenges.20	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The	   ‘progress’	   of	   automotive	   technologies	   is	   understood	   by	   following	   an	   implicit	  ‘evolutionary’	  model;	  it	  is	  not	  presented	  as	  a	  problem	  to	  ‘fix’,	  but	  as	  a	  challenge	  that	  
enthusiasts	  mobilise	   to	  engage	  with.21	  A	   ‘challenge’	  defines	  more	   than	   the	  objective	  conditions	  of	  a	  problem.	  A	  ‘challenge’	  has	  a	  curious	  ontology;	  similar	  to	  a	  ‘problem’	  (in	  the	  non-­‐Deleuzian,	  normative	  sense)	  it	  begs	  resolution	  (‘meeting	  the	  challenge’),	  but	  it	  also	  has	  an	  explicit	  affective	  dimension	  (‘rising	  to	  the	  challenge’).	  The	  concept	  of	   the	   ‘challenge’	   is	   a	   useful	   way	   to	   think	   about	   a	   range	   of	   amateur	   or	   everyday	  practices	   that	   collectively	   involve	   some	   kind	   of	   practical	   and	   creative	   labour	  premised	  on	  an	  affective	  mobilisation.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  conditions	  of	  experience	  for	  the	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’,	  such	  as	  a	  broken	  car,	  tonight’s	  bourgeois	  dinner	  party	  or	  the	  contemporary	  rite	  of	  passage	  of	  buying	  your	  first	  home,	  have	  a	  concrete	  ‘kicking-­‐a-­‐rock’	   and	   socially	   procedural	   reality.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   experience	  exists	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   ‘problem’	   or	   ‘challenge’,	   which	   is	   fully	   real,	   but	   of	   a	  different	   incorporeal	   or	   virtual	   modality.	   I	   am	   using	   the	   term	   ‘challenge’	   here	  partially	  because	  of	  Moorhouse’s	  insight,	  but	  also	  for	  convenience.22	  	  The	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  part	  a	  process	  of	  iterative	  experience-­‐based	  learning	   and	   part	   reflective	   practice	   of	   the	   selection	   of	   tactical	   elements	   from	  experience	   at	   the	   level	   of	   both	   consciousness	   and	   tacit	   embodiment.	   Moorhouse	  discusses	   ‘know-­‐how’	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   labour	   of	   hot	   rodding	   enthusiasts	   and	   its	  representation	  in	  Hot	  Rod	  magazine.23	  The	  affective	  dimension	  is	  clearly	  present	  in	  Moorhouse’s	   analysis,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   he	   discusses	   the	   labour	   of	   enthusiasts	   as	  something	   subjectively	   enjoyable	   and	   worthy	   of	   meaning.	   But	   again	   even	   this	  subjective	   dimension	   of	   affect	   is	   not	   the	   focus	   of	   his	   research,	   and	   his	   theoretical	  apparatus	   did	   not	   allow	   him	   to	   explore	   the	   dimensions	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   and	  enthusiasm	  that	  are	  of	  interest	  here.	  First,	  Moorhouse	  posits	  enthusiast	  labour	  as	  an	  ideological	  function	  of	  the	  ‘work	  ethic’	  and	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	  valorisation	  of	  working-­‐class	   leisure	   activities	   that,	   following	   Aristotle,	   is	   to	   implicate	   technē	   as	   part	   of	  
phronēsis	  (‘practical	  wisdom’).24	  	  Second,	  Moorhouse’s	  goal	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  particular	  meanings	  or	  ‘ethics’	  become	   associated	   with	   particular	   ‘works’	   and	   explores	   this	   problematic	   in	   hot	  rodding	   through	   the	   example	   of	   mechanical	   labour.	   The	   meanings	   of	   mechanical	  labour	   (of	   working	   on	   the	   mechanics	   of	   vehicles)	   are	   examined	   as	   ‘presented’	   in	  specialist	  magazines	   and	  books	  of	  post-­‐war	  US	  hot	   rodding.25	  He	   focuses	  on	   those	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examples	   that	   emphasise	   ‘the	   importance	   of	   applying	   and	   testing	   knowledge	   in	   a	  practical,	   down	   to	   earth	  way’	   to	   critique	  a	   conception	  of	   the	  modern	   ‘conspicuous	  consumption’	   society,	   arguing	   that	   hot	   rodding	   was	   ‘more	   in	   tune	   with	   older	  virtues’.26	   Moorhouse	   is	   proffering	   a	   defence	   of	   working-­‐class	   leisure-­‐time	   labour	  and	   associated	   activities	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   ‘radical’	   critique	   to	   ‘refer	   to	   ‘capital’	  shaping	  ‘leisure’	  and	  to	  dwell	  on	  ‘commodity	  provision’.27	  This	  ‘radical’	  diagnosis	  of	  labour	   and	   exchange	   relations	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   dialectic	   between	   subsumption	   and	  antagonism	  is	  naive,	  but	  so	  is	  Moorhouse’s	  rearticulation	  of	  labour	  in	  terms	  of	  some	  alleged	   ‘work	   ethic’	   as	   ‘presented’	   in	   partisan	   enthusiast	   magazines.	   To	   use	  Foucault’s	  terminology,	  magazines	  are	  part	  of	  a	  popular	  dispositif	  of	  power	  relations	  that	  seeks	  to	  shape	  the	  scene	  in	  particular	  economic	  and	  social	  ways.	  	  In	   his	   analysis	   Moorhouse	   isolates	   a	   tension	   between,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  emphasis	   of	   the	   presentation	   in	   magazines	   'not	   simply	   on	   working	   metal	   but	   on	  theoretical	   understanding,	   scientific	   knowledge	   and	   designing	   skill,’	   and,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  how	  theoretical	  knowledge	  was	  'not	  ...	  regarded	  as	  important	  in	  its	  own	  right;	   what	   mattered	   was	   its	   application’.28	   Moorhouse	   is	   noting	   a	   circuitous	  movement	   here	   from	   experience	   (‘down	   to	   earth’,	   ‘working	   metal’)	   to	   discourse	  (‘theoretical	   knowledge’)	   to	   experience	   (‘application’).	   I	   suggest	   that	   rather	   than	   a	  circuitous	  movement,	  the	  dynamic	  of	  abstraction	  and	  ‘in-­‐action’	   is	  best	  understood	  as	  an	  iterative	  process	  of	  the	  differential	  repetition	  of	  experience.	  	  
—‘KNOW-HOW’ AND THE TRANSVERSALITY OF EXPERIENCE ‘Know-­‐how’	  is	  not	  absolutely	  singular	  in	  a	  spatiotemporal	  sense.	  If	  I	  work	  on	  this	  car	  here	   today	   then	   depending	   on	   the	   character	   of	   my	   experience	   I	   am	   actualising	  virtual	   tendencies	   that	   were	   partially	   actualised	   possibly	   hundreds	   of	   times	   (and	  spaces)	  previously.	  A	  new	  ‘challenge’	  or	  problem	  may	  actualise	  existing	  ‘know-­‐how’	  in	  new	  ways,	  thus	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  existing	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  repeated	  through	  its	  differences.	  The	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  in	  the	  body	  is	  an	  intensive	  process	  and	  its	   sequence	   can	  be	   characterised	  by	   the	   series	   of	   ‘challenges’	   the	   subject	   engages	  with;	   ‘to	   experience’	   here	   is	   always	   at	   the	   same	   time	   ‘to	   experiment	  [expérimenter]'.29	   Key	   in	  Deleuze’s	   philosophy	   of	   transcendental	   empiricism	   is	   the	  process	   of	   disjunctive	   synthesis	   whereby	   the	   ‘problematic	   field	   ...	   conditions	   a	  differenciation	  [différencier]	  within	  the	  milieu	  in	  which	  it	  is	  incarnated’.30	  This	  is	  the	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‘milieu	  of	   the	  event’;	  what	  Brian	  Massumi	  calls	   the	  amodality	  of	  experience	   that	   is	  always	   ‘in-­‐relation’.31	   According	   to	   Inna	   Semetsky,	   Deleuze	   argues	   these	   ‘[virtual]	  tendencies	   per	   se	   cannot	   be	   represented,	   they	   cannot	   be	   thought	   of	   in	   spatial	  terms—otherwise	   they	   turn	   into	   discrete	   multiplicities,	   betraying	   the	   notion	   of	  multiplicity	   as	   intensive	   and	   continuous’.32	   I	   want	   to	   suggest	   that	   even	   though	   I	  agree	   with	   Semetsky	   that	   a	   spatial	   or	   even	   (linear)	   temporal	   appreciation	   of	   the	  ‘virtual	   tendencies’	   apprehended	  by	   intuition	   is	   reductive,	   there	   is	   another	  way	   to	  gather	  congruent	   tendencies	   together	   that	  avoids	   thinking	   intensive	  multiplicity	  of	  problematics	   as	   discrete.	   This	   is	   to	   treat	   the	   virtual	   dimension	   as	   composed	   (or	  ‘structured’)	  according	  to	  serial	  problematics.33	  The	   differentially	   repeated	   experiences	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   are	   gathered	   around	   a	  
problematic	   contiguity.	   That	   is,	   the	   differentially	   repeated	   events	   of	   experience,	  within	  which	  the	  subject	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  in-­‐acts	  his	  or	  her	  capacities,	   forms	  a	  series	  that	   is	  problematically	   contiguous	  rather	   than	  spatially	  or	   temporally	  contiguous.34	  In	  philosophy,	  contiguity	  is	  a	  relation	  of	  proximity	  whereby	  elements	  of	  the	  relation	  are	   in	   contact	   with	   each	   other.35	   Spatial	   contiguity	   describes	   a	   situation	   whereby	  relations	   of	   proximity	   are	   determined	   by	   extensive	   distributions	   in	   space,	   such	   as	  distributions	   within	   a	   neighbourhood	   or	   city.	   Temporal	   contiguity	   describes	   a	  situation	   involving	   temporal	   relations	   of	   proximity,	   such	   as	   the	   notion	   of	   one’s	  generation.	  These	  Aristotelian	  definitions	  of	  contiguity	  are	  attempts	   to	  account	   for	  the	   extension	   of	   elements	   in	   the	  world.36	   By	   shifting	   to	   a	   question	   of	   problematic	  contiguity	   I	   will	   address	   the	   intensive	   relations	   of	   proximity	   in	   the	   events	   of	  experience	   involving	   the	   development	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   across	   non-­‐local	   spatio-­‐temporalities	  that	  gather	  around	  a	  virtual	  and	  singular	  problematic.	  Put	  simply,	  two	  experiences	   are	   problematically	   contiguous	   when	   they	   are	   both	   involved	   in	   the	  development	   (as	   ‘differential	   repetition’)	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   and	   the	   ‘how’	   develops	  across	   this	   serial	  problematic	   contiguity	  of	   experience.	  The	  problematic	   contiguity	  of	   integral	   events	   through	   which	   ‘know-­‐how’	   develops	   is	   part	   of	   the	   general	  ‘migratory	   nonlocal	   linkage’	   of	   elements	   of	   experience	   operating	   on	   an	   amodal	  register.37	   Two	   experiences	   of	   a	   singular	   differentially	   repeated	   ‘know-­‐how’	   are	  
transversally	   related,	   albeit	   differentially	   attuned	   to	   the	   specific	   conditions	   of	  experience	   in	   each	   repetition.	   ‘Transversality’	   is	   the	   non-­‐local,	   non-­‐hierarchical	  proximity	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  elements	  in	  relation.38	  I	  am	  using	  it	  here	  to	  think	  about	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the	   complex	  movement	  within	   experience	   of	   elements	   from	   previously	   developed	  and	  future	  developing	  events	  of	  experience.	  Establishing	   the	   problematic	   contiguity	   of	   experience	   is	   essential	   for,	   first,	  appreciating	   the	   way	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	   developed	   through	   experience	   and,	   second,	  understanding	   the	   enabling	   role	   of	   ‘how	   to’	   texts	   in	   this	   transversal	   movement.	  ‘Developed’	   in	   this	   context	  does	  not	  mean	  only	  an	   initial	   intuitive	  apprehension	  of	  virtual	   tendencies,	   but	   includes	   the	   iterative	   and	   differentiating	   process	   of	   its	  repetition.	  Each	  experience	  is	  a	  differentiation	  of	  a	  previous	  (and,	  depending	  on	  the	  context,	   felt-­‐tendency	   of	   a	   future)	   multiplicity	   of	   experiences.	   As	   soon	   as	   a	   given	  contingency	  of	  practice	  is	  anticipated,	  the	  process	  of	  the	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  also	  becomes	  the	  procedure	  of	  its	  application.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  ‘accumulation’	  of	  experience	   is	   not	   a	   summative	  process,	   but	   a	  differential	   process.	   Experiences	   are	  repeated	   in	   different	   ways	   and	   the	   ‘know-­‐how’	   develops	   across	   a	   number	   of	  iterations	   through	   a	   ‘disjunctive	   synthesis’	   of	   these	   differences.39	   Distinction	  between	  the	  relative	  quality	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  not	  based	  on	  one	  person	  having	  ‘more’	  experience	  than	  another;	  rather,	   they	  have	  a	   ‘keener’	  (or	   ‘duller’)	  appreciation	  of	  a	  given	  state	  of	  affairs.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  means	  that	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  never	  static;	  if	  it	  is	   being	  deployed,	   then	   it	   is	   always	   being	  developed	   by	   contemporary	   experiences	  integrated	  with	  the	  active	  and	  embodied	  memory	  of	  prior	  experiences.	  	  Returning	   to	   the	  example	  of	  Murphy’s	   ‘how	   to’	   text	  on	  building	  a	   custom	  car,	  after	   the	   passage	   discussed	   earlier	   comes	   a	   brief	   step-­‐by-­‐step	   account	   of	   how	   to	  integrate	   the	   ‘theoretical’	   knowledge	  of	   technical	  manuals	  and	  magazines	  with	   the	  practical	  act	  itself:	  First,	   read	   the	   instructions	   in	   your	   books	   [‘book’	   is	   also	   common	  enthusiast	  argot	  for	  ‘magazine’]	  or	  the	  ones	  that	  came	  with	  the	  parts.	  Then	  read	  them	  again.	  Next,	  visualize	  the	  sequence	  of	  actions.	  You	  should	  read	  the	   instructions	   and	   visualize	  what	  will	   happen	   several	   times.	  When	   the	  procedures	  feel	  familiar,	  you’re	  ready	  to	  begin	  the	  assembly	  for	  real.	  If	  you	  take	   your	   time	   and	   follow	   the	   directions	   precisely,	   you’ll	   see	   an	   engine	  gradually	  take	  shape.40	  	  The	  visualisation	  Murphy	  describes	  is	  a	  practical	  act	  of	  the	  imagination,	  both	  in	  the	  ‘mind’	  but	  also	  explicitly	  a	  thinking	  through	  (of)	  the	  body	  to	  become	  familiar	  with	  the	  movements	   required.	  Murphy	  may	   not	   have	   intended	   an	   ontological	   discussion	   of	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such	  a	  practical	  act,	  but	  his	  use	  of	  ‘for	  real’	  enables	  me	  to	  make	  an	  important	  point.	  The	  practical	  act	  and	  experience	  of	  the	  event	   ‘to	  assemble’	  began	  before	  there	  was	  an	  engine	  to	  assemble	  and	  continued	  after	  Murphy	  apparently	  assembled	  the	  actual	  engine.	  The	  problematic	  contiguity	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  can	  be	  mapped	  across	  a	  number	  of	  transversally	  related	  temporal	  series.	  In	  Murphy’s	  case	  these	  are	  signalled	  by	  the	  1967	   Ford	   Fairlane	   automobile,	   the	   1969	   Muscle	   Parts	   magazine,	   the	   other	  congruent	   temporal	   series	   of	   his	   technical	   editor’s	   ‘know-­‐how’,	   the	   multiple	  indeterminate	  temporal	  series	  of	  his	  various	  discussions	  at	  speed	  shops,	  enthusiast	  events	  and	  so	  on.	  	  The	   procedures	   that	   Murphy	   describes	   are	   instantiated	   codifications	   of	   the	  
process	   of	   thinking	   through	   the	   body;	   it	   is	   a	   superposition	   of	   prior	   and	   future	  experience	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  they	  come	  to	  ‘feel	  familiar’.	  Massumi	  calls	  this	  ‘forward	  projection	  of	  perception	  into	  latent	  action-­‐choice’	  a	  process	  of	  ‘possibilisation’:	  	  Each	  actual	  conjunction	  is	  a	  dynamic	  mixture	  of	  different	  orders	  materially	  combining	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   actually	   under	   way	   with	   possibilizing	  extensions	   beyond	   itself.	   The	   inextricability	   of	   the	   experiencing	   and	   the	  extension	  make	  perception	  an	  analysis	  in	  action	  and	  the	  perceived	  ‘thing’	  a	  sensible	   concept	  …	  The	   [object]-­‐thing	   is	  all	  of	   the	   thought-­‐perceptions	   in	  which	   it	   is	   implicated.	   Latent	   in	   the	   [object],	   as	   a	   thing	   ‘in	   itself,’	   is	   its	  connectability	  with	  other	  things	  outside	  itself	  ...	  Perception,	  even	  before	  its	  thinking	  out,	  is	  a	  limited	  selection,	  an	  actualization	  of	  potential	  plug-­‐ins.41	  	  For	   Massumi,	   the	   production	   of	   explicit	   knowledge	   that	   can	   be	   codified	   in	  discourse	  as	  the	  subject	  of	  instrumental	  reason	  requires	  an	  operation	  of	  abstraction	  that	  ‘thinks	  out’	  perception	  from	  an	  object.42	  This	  is	  the	  work	  of	  science,	  as	  noted	  by	  Michael	  Polanyi	  (see	  discussion	  below),	  to	  apprehend	  objects	  and	  ‘nature’	  as	  explicit	  knowledge.	  ‘How	  to’	  texts	  are	  direct	  interventions	  into	  this	  process	  of	  possibilisation	  and	  the	  transversal	  movement	  of	  affect	  in	  experience	  at	  the	  level	  of	  perception	  and	  the	  modulation	  of	  affect	  that	  are	  both	  integrated	  into	  practical	  acts	  and	  the	  level	  at	  which	  such	  a	  practice	  happens.	  	  
—ENTHUSIASM AND ‘BLACK-BOXED’ SOCIO-TECHNICAL SYSTEMS The	   affects	   of	   an	   enabling	   ‘challenge’	   and	   the	   amodal	   affective	   dimension	   of	  experience	  come	  together	  in	  productive	  ways	  in	  Polanyi’s	  work	  on	  the	  intrinsic	  role	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of	  passion	  in	  the	  production	  of	  scientific	  knowledge.43	  Instead	  of	  a	  heuristic	  of	  doubt	  or	   a	   suspension	   of	   belief,	   Polanyi	   argues	   for	   a	   heuristic	   of	   passion	   premised	   on	  belief.	   Indeed,	   the	   way	   he	   introduced	   ‘personal	   knowledge’	   and	   a	   philosophical	  conception	  of	   ‘belief’	   into	   the	  production	  of	   scientific	   knowledge	  was	  not	   received	  well	   at	   the	   time	   of	   publication.44	   For	   Polanyi,	   ‘intellectual	   passion’	   is	   an	   integral	  element	   in	   the	   process	   of	   scientific	   discovery	   and	   development	   of	   scientific	  knowledge.	  Polanyi’s	  	  main	  point	  is	  that	  ‘into	  every	  act	  of	  knowing	  there	  enters	  into	  a	  tacit	  and	  passionate	  contribution	  of	  the	  person	  knowing	  what	  is	  being	  known,	  and	  that	   this	   coefficient	   is	   no	   mere	   imperfection,	   but	   a	   necessary	   component	   of	   all	  knowledge’.45	  Affect	   is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  as	   the	  subject	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   must	   be	   mobilised	   by	   active	   affects;	   what	   Polanyi	   called	   the	   ‘passion	  coefficient’	   of	   knowledge	   above.	   According	   to	   Deleuze,	   passions	   furnish	   the	  epistemic	   associations	   of	   the	   mind	   with	   ‘motives	   and	   dispositions	   to	   act,	  inclinations,	   and	   particular	   interests’.46	   In	   his	   discussion	   of	   explorers,	   Polanyi	  describes	  commitment	  to	  belief	  as	  an	  integral	  element	  of	  intellectual	  passion	  that	  is	  satisfied	  by	  discovery.	  The	  explorer	  enjoys	  a	  ‘daring	  anticipation	  of	  reality’.47	  Polanyi	  suggests	   this	   creative	   dimension	   of	   scientific	   endeavour	   relies	   on	   a	   ‘heuristic	  passion’:	  We	   have	   to	   cross	   the	   logical	   gap	   between	   a	   problem	   and	   its	   solution	   by	  relying	   on	   the	   unspecifiable	   impulse	   of	   our	   heuristic	   passion,	   and	   must	  undergo	   as	   we	   do	   so	   a	   change	   of	   our	   intellectual	   personality.	   Like	   all	  ventures	   in	   which	   we	   comprehensively	   dispose	   of	   ourselves,	   such	   an	  intentional	   change	   of	   our	   personality	   requires	   a	   passionate	   motive	   to	  accomplish	  it.	  Originality	  must	  be	  passionate.48	  	  Polanyi	   argues	   that	   the	   gratification	   of	   instinctual	   appetites	   (hunger,	   sex	   and	  fear)	  is	  a	  manner	  of	  verification.	  There	  is	  a	  parallel	  to	  intellectual	  passions	  in	  that	  ‘all	  passions	   animating	   and	   shaping	   discovery	   imply	   a	   belief	   in	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	  knowledge	  of	  which	  these	  passions	  declare	  the	  value’.49	  That	  is,	  Polanyi	  suggests,	  a	  (not	   infallible)	   ‘competence’	   of	   intellectual	   passions	   is	   to	   recognise	   truth.	   The	  satisfaction	  of	  intellectual	  passions	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  verification	  of	  discovery,	  as	  discovery	  ‘terminates	  the	  problem	  from	  which	  it	  started’	  and	  ‘leaves	  behind	  knowledge’.50	  	  The	  more	  general	   term	   I	   shall	   use	   to	  describe	  what	  Polanyi	   calls	   the	   ‘passion	  coefficient’	   is	   enthusiasm.	   ‘Enthusiasm’	   has	   been	   understood	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   quasi-­‐
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religious	   mode	   of	   subjectivity	   (or	   subjectivisation)	   and	   to	   the	   best	   of	   my	  understanding	   has	   not	   been	   explicitly	   discussed	   in	   the	   context	   of	   epistemology	   or	  related	  philosophies	  except	  in	  negative	  ways.	  Indeed,	  ‘enthusiasm’	  has	  traditionally	  been	   understood	   as	   the	   enemy	   of	   rationality,	   evidenced	   in	   the	   way	   various	  philosophers	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  era	  did	  battle	  to	  ward	  off	  ‘enthusiasms’	  as	  a	  form	  of	   ‘fanaticism’	   in	   the	  name	  of	   a	  higher	   rationality	  or	  ward	  off	   enthusiasm	   to	  make	  space	   for	   ‘clearheaded	   thinking’.51	   For	   example,	   the	   US-­‐based	   grassroots	   direct	  action	  group	  the	  Tea	  Party	  is	  understood	  as	  collective	  political	  mobilisation	  born	  of	  a	  quasi-­‐religious	  political	  enthusiasm.52	  	  Following	   Kant,	   enthusiasm	   is	   the	   ‘idea	   of	   the	   good	   joined	   with	   an	   affect’	  leading	   to	   ‘a	   state	   of	   mind	   that	   seems	   to	   be	   sublime’,	   because	   enthusiasm	   is	   ‘a	  stretching	  of	  the	  powers	  through	  ideas,	  which	  give	  the	  mind	  a	  momentum	  that	  acts	  far	   more	   powerfully	   and	   persistently	   than	   the	   impetus	   given	   by	   sensory	  representations’.	  Kant	  continues:	  	  Only	   such	   a	   mentality	   is	   called	   noble—an	   expression	   subsequently	   also	  applied	  to	  things,	  e.g.	  buildings,	  costume,	  a	  literary	  style,	  a	  bodily	  posture,	  etc.,	  if	  it	  arouses	  not	  so	  much	  astonishment	  (an	  affect	  in	  the	  representation	  of	  novelty	   that	  exceeds	  expectation)	  as	  admiration	   (as	  astonishment	   that	  does	   cease	   when	   novelty	   is	   lost),	   which	   happens	   when	   ideas	   in	   their	  presentation	   unintentionally	   and	   without	   artifice	   agree	   with	   aesthetic	  satisfaction.53	  I	   am	   approaching	   enthusiasm	   in	   a	   different	  way	   or,	   rather,	   treating	  Kant’s	   insight	  into	  the	  aesthetic	  character	  of	  stretching	  the	  ‘powers’	  not	  by	  ideas,	  but	  through	  the	  affective	  and	  problematic	  dimension	  of	  ‘admiration’	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  disposition.	  This	  is	  closer	   to	   the	  way	  Erin	  Manning	  has	  used	   the	  concept	  of	  enthusiasm	  as	  a	  way	   to	  grasp	  how	  it	  is	  constituted	  as	  properly	  pre-­‐individual	  in	  the	  field	  of	  expression;	  the	  enthusiastic	  is	  prior	  to	  the	  ontogenesis	  of	  an	  individual	  through	  expression:	  It	  is	  not	  the	  human	  as	  pre-­‐constituted	  who	  is	  enthusiastic.	  It	  is	  the	  field	  of	  expression	   itself	   that	   takes	   the	   shape	   of	   enthusiasm.	   Enthusiasm	  percolates	   at	   the	   very	   limits	   of	   sayability	   in	   the	   before	   of	   the	   subject	   or	  object	  as	  such.	  Enthusiasm	  as	  a	  movement-­‐with	  that	  colours	  expressibility,	  giving	  a	  certain	  allure	  to	  the	  coming-­‐to-­‐expression.54	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Jean	  Francois	  Lyotard’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Kantian	  enthusiasm	  also	  furnishes	  the	  concept	   with	   an	   integral	   role	   in	   the	   process	   of	   individuation;	   enthusiasm	   is	   an	  ‘energetic	  sign,	  a	  tensor	  of	  Wunsch’	  that	  ‘produces	  an	  Affekt	  "of	  the	  vigorous	  kind"’.55	  For	  Lyotard,	  enthusiasm	  signals	  the	  most	  ‘improbable	  passage’,	  that	  of	  an	  ‘impasse’	  that	   is	   both	   a	   becoming	   and	   an	   overcoming.56	   What	   I	   have	   been	   describing	   as	   a	  ‘challenge’	   is	   similarly	   both	   an	   impasse	   that	   enthusiasts	   overcome	   and	   the	  experiential	  passage	  of	  enthusiasm	  through	  which	  ‘know-­‐how’	  is	  produced.	  	  The	  mobilisation	  of	  an	  enthusiast	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  passion.	  Passion	  in	  this	  context	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  giddy	  excitement.	  More	  often	  than	  not	  it	  is	  a	  co-­‐assembly	  of	  active	  affects	  that	  increase	  the	  enthusiast’s	  capacity	  to	  act.	  There	  is	  a	  more	  complex	  point	   to	   be	   made	   here	   regarding	   the	   process	   of	   collective	   individuation	   and	   the	  properly	   impersonal	   character	   of	   these	   affects.	   The	   experience	   of	   enthusiasm	   is	  often	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  impersonal	  affects	  that	  an	  enthusiast	  shares	  with	  others.	  The	  opposite	  of	  enthusiasm	  is	  when	  a	  passive	  affective	  relation	  is	  assumed,	  such	   as	   in	   charismatic	   power	   relations.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   socio-­‐technical	   systems,	  Jacques	   Ellul	   captures	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   passivity	   of	   non-­‐enthusiast	   relations	   in	   his	  discussion	  of	  the	  co-­‐adaption	  of	  humanity	  through	  the	  incorporation	  of	  ‘technique’.	  The	   expression	   of	   technique,	   Ellul	   argues,	   is	   the	   ‘iron	   ring	   with	   which	   technique	  surrounds	   and	   localizes’	   the	   passionate	   sources	   of	   ‘vital	   energy	   which	   might	   be	  summarized	   as	   sexuality,	   spirituality,	   and	   capacity	   for	   feeling’.57	   In	   the	   end,	   all	  ‘attempts	  at	  culture,	  freedom,	  and	  creative	  endeavour	  have	  become	  mere	  entries	  in	  technique’s	   filing	   cabinet’.58	   Ellul’s	   assumption	   is	   that	   users	   of	   technology	   will	  necessarily	  allow	   themselves	   to	  become	  constituted	  as	   subjects	   characterised	  by	  a	  
passive	  relation	  to	  technology.	  Ellul’s	  pessimism	  needs	  to	  be	  challenged;	  humans	  do	  passionately	   engage	   with	   technologies,	   technical	   systems	   and	   various	   other	  designed	  objects,	  environments	  and	  practices.	  The	  passionate	  being	  of	  being	  human	  is	  now	  expressed	  and	  even	  induced	  through	  socio-­‐technical	  systems.	  	  Some	   direction	   is	   provided	   by	   Polanyi	   when	   he	   shifts	   from	   thinking	   about	  science	   to	   engaging	   with	   practical	   problems	   and	   compares	   the	   practice	   of	   the	  scientist	   to	   the	   ‘technician’	   or	   ‘technologist’.	   The	   scientist,	   in	   Polanyi’s	   analysis,	   is	  concerned	  with	  the	  ‘natural	  order’,	  while	  the	  ‘technician’	  or	  ‘technologist’,	  although	  working	  within	   a	   similar	   framework	   of	   discovery,	   has	   a	   far	  more	   focused	   heuristic	  passion:	  	  
	   	  VOLUME19 NUMBER1 MAR2013	  286 
He	   follows	   the	   intimations,	  not	  of	  a	  natural	  order,	  but	  of	  a	  possibility	   for	  making	  things	  work	  in	  a	  new	  way	  for	  an	  acceptable	  purpose,	  and	  cheaply	  enough	   to	   show	   a	   profit.	   In	   feeling	   his	   way	   towards	   new	   problems,	   in	  collecting	  clues	  and	  pondering	  perspectives,	  the	  technologist	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	   a	   whole	   panorama	   of	   advantages	   and	   disadvantages	   which	   the	  scientist	  ignores.	  He	  must	  be	  keenly	  susceptible	  to	  people’s	  wants	  and	  able	  to	   assess	   the	   price	   at	   which	   they	   would	   be	   prepared	   to	   satisfy	   them.	   A	  passionate	   interest	   in	   such	   momentary	   constellations	   is	   foreign	   to	   the	  scientist,	  whose	  eye	  is	  fixed	  on	  the	  inner	  law	  of	  nature.59	  	  The	  constellation	  of	  interests	  organised	  around	  the	  focused	  heuristic	  passion	  of	  the	  technician	   is	   in	   part	   determined	   by	   the	   set	   of	   material	   advantages	   afforded	   by	   a	  technology;	  what	  Polanyi	  calls	  the	  rules	  'taught	  to	  us	  by	  technology’,	  the	  ‘operational	  principle’	  of	  a	  given	  technology.60	  Subjects	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  have	  a	  tactical	  relation	  to	  these	   ‘rules-­‐as-­‐operational-­‐principles’	   designed	   into	   technological	   objects	   and	  reproduced	  through	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  socio-­‐technical	  networks.61	  Following	   Polanyi,	   the	   singular	   points	   of	   the	   system	   are	   isolated,	   so	   that	   an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  system	  develops	  as	  the	  ‘particulars	  are	  noticed	  in	  different	  ways	  ...	   [first]	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  particulars	  focally,	   in	  the	  second,	  that	  we	  notice	  them	  subsidiarily	   in	   terms	  of	   their	  participation	   in	  a	  whole’.62	  The	  successful	  production	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  is	  not	  measured	  by	  the	  production	  of	  (scientific)	  knowledge	  or	  even	  necessarily	  an	  understanding	  (although	  these	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  process),	  but	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  given	  practice	  results	  in	  a	  technical	  system	  functioning.	  Functionality	  is	  the	  enabling	  limit	  of	  the	  development	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’.	  While	  Polanyi	  is	  drawing	  on	  Gestalt	  psychology	  in	  his	  use	  of	  the	  term	  ‘whole’,	   I	  am	  suggesting	  an	  alternative	  understanding.	  Polanyi	  argued	   that	   ‘inductive	  problem	   is	  an	   intimation	  of	   coherence	   among	   hitherto	   uncomprehended	   particulars	   and	   the	   problem	   is	  genuine	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  intimation	  is	  true’.63	  I	  am	  suggesting	  in	  the	  case	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  the	  coherence	  of	  a	  problem	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  functionality	  of	  the	  given	   socio-­‐technical	   system.	  An	  enthusiast	  may	  pursue	  understanding	  beyond	   the	  function-­‐limit	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   necessary	   for	   ‘know-­‐how’	   itself.	  Functionality	   is	   a	   limit	   for	   the	   development	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’,	   but	   does	   not	   coincide	  with	   a	   ‘form’	   of	   the	   socio-­‐technical	   system	  with	   which	   the	   subject	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  engages.	  Rather,	  the	  subject	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  apprehends	  the	  singularities	  of	  the	  socio-­‐
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technical	   system	   (or	   perhaps	   even	   actualises	   them,	   which	   is	   the	   case	   for	   the	  artisanal	  plastic	  arts).	  One	   way	   to	   approach	   the	   ‘stabilisation’	   of	   these	   operational	   principles	   is	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  actor-­‐network	  theory	  (ANT)	  concept	  of	  ‘black-­‐boxing’.	  The	  term	  ‘black	  box’	  as	  it	  is	  used	  in	  this	  context	  is	  borrowed	  from	  technical	  fields	  where	  it	  refers	  to	  literally	   a	   ‘black	   box’	   drawn	   around	   a	   complex	   component	   or	   part	   of	   a	   circuit	  diagram.	  Through	  ‘black-­‐boxing’,	  one	  is	  allowed	  to	  disregard	  complexities	  of	  circuit,	  machinery	  or	  code	  assigned	  to	  the	  dynamics	  within	  the	  box.64	  ‘A	  black	  box	  contains	  that	   which	   no	   longer	   needs	   to	   be	   considered,	   those	   things	   whose	   contents	   have	  become	   a	  matter	   of	   indifference.’65	   ANT	   uses	   the	   concept	   to	   refer	   to	   networks	   of	  action	   and	   distribution	   of	   agency	   that	   lead	   to	   technologies	   and	   facts	   becoming	  ‘stabilised’.	  Madeleine	  Akirich	  suggests	  that	  stabilised	  technologies	  are	  those	  where	  the	   ‘innovator’	   (as	   distinct	   to	   the	   ‘user’)	   is	   ‘no	   longer	   present,	   and	   study	   of	   the	  ordinary	   user	   is	   not	   very	   useful	   because	   he	   or	   she	   has	   already	   taken	   on	   board	  prescriptions	  implied	  in	  interaction	  with	  the	  machine’.66	  To	  return	  to	  the	  example	  of	  Murphy	  and	  his	  custom	  car,	  he	  captures	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  ‘black	  boxing’	  of	  technology	  when	   he	   notes	   that	   the	   car’s	   engine	   is	   ‘not	   an	   unsolvable	   mystery’.67	   For	   some	  consumers	  automotive	  technologies	  are	  ‘black	  boxed’	  socio-­‐technologies;	  yet,	  in	  the	  earliest	   automobile	   era	   vehicles	   were	   often	   sold	   with	   a	   set	   of	   tools	   and	   the	  expectation	   that	   consumers	   would	   carry	   out	   their	   own	   maintenance.	   Marc	  Frauenfelder	  notes	   that	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  Model	  T	   the	  burden	  of	   self-­‐maintenance	  was	   not	   an	   ‘unreasonable	   assumption	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   Ford	   Motor	   Company,	  because	   a	   large	   percentage	   of	   the	   people	   who	   bought	   Model	   Ts	   had	   experience	  maintaining	   farm	   machinery’.68	   In	   his	   history	   of	   auto	   mechanics,	   Kevin	   Borg	  similarly	   notes	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   farmers	  with	   agricultural	  machinery	  meant	  they	  had	  a	  ‘willingness	  to	  go	  into	  a	  machine	  and	  "figure	  it	  out"’.69	  As	  I	  alluded	  to	  in	  the	   introduction,	   the	   historical	   specificity	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  means	   that	   an	   enthusiast	  working	   on	   a	   Model	   T	   now	   has	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   compared	   to	   the	  1920s	   farmer	   working	   on	   the	   ‘same’	   vehicle,	   because	   the	   socio-­‐technology	   of	   the	  Model	  T	  is	  ‘stabilised’	  in	  different	  ways.	  ‘Know-­‐how’	  is	  a	  practical	  epistemological	  tool	  for	  opening	  ‘black-­‐boxed’	  socio-­‐technical	   systems	   through	   the	   overcoming	   of	   ‘challenges’.	   The	   ‘user’	   becomes	   an	  ‘innovator’,	   but	  one	   that	  does	  not	  have	   the	   same	  degree	  of	   technical	  mastery	  over	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the	   design	   of	   the	   technical	   object,	   nor	   the	   same	   socio-­‐political	   agency	   to	   stabilise	  socio-­‐technical	  networks	  within	  which	  objects	   are	   (re)produced	   (as	   enthusiasts	  of	  obsolescent	  consumer	  technologies,	  such	  as	  the	  Model	  T,	  will	  attest).	  Unlike	  formal	  scientific	  or	  even	  professional	  engineering	  knowledges	  (although	  some,	  if	  not	  most,	  engineers,	   like	   those	  Latour	  describes,	  would	  reject	   this	  characterisation),	   subjects	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  have	  an	  ad	  hoc	  appreciation	  of	  technical	  systems.	  There	  is	  a	  common	  experience	  of	  enthusiasts	  the	  moment	  they	  come	  to	  appreciate	  what	  they	  consider	  are	  the	  general	  coordinates	  of	  a	  problem	  and	  face	  the	  prospect	  of	  attempting	  to	  fix	  or	   work	   on	   something	   they	   have	   not	   yet	   had	   to	   work	   on	   previously.	   This	   is	   a	  daunting	  experience	  and	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  ‘black	  box’	  is	  truly	  ‘opened’.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  engagement	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  proceeds	  by	  way	  of	  an	  assumed	  holism,	  where	   ‘function’	   is	  necessarily	  an	   inference	  of	   the	  Gestalt	  performativity	  of	  parts.	   This	   is	   insufficient	   to	   account	   for	   ‘know-­‐how’	   being	   a	   practical	   knowledge,	  however,	   where	   the	   subject’s	   dispositional	   co-­‐assembly	   of	   affects	   is	   either	  affirmative	   (enthusiasm),	   diminutive	   (exhaustion,	   ‘beat’)	   or	   both	   at	   once	   (by	  degrees)	   and	   enjoin	   with	   the	   non-­‐human	   affects	   of	   socio-­‐technical	   systems	   (the	  ‘stubbornness’	   of	   stuck	   window,	   the	   ‘slickness’	   of	   a	   gear	   shift	   mechanism,	   the	  ‘efficiency’	   of	   ‘German	   engineering’	   or	   the	   ‘finish’	   of	   a	   set	   of	   cutlery).	   In	   most	  enthusiast	   discourses,	   these	   non-­‐human	   affects	   are	   described	   using	   technical	  terminology	  in	  a	  specific	  ironic	  or	  subcultural	  way.	  An	  appreciation	  of	  functionality	  is	   immanent	   to	   the	   appreciation	   of	   the	   system	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’	   that	  shapes	  the	  subject’s	  engagement.	  Over	  successive	  iterations	  of	  situation	  the	  degree	  of	   appreciation	   of	   the	   system	   increases	   until	   a	   given	   subject	   has	   a	   ‘working	  knowledge’.	  	  
—CONCLUSION: TURNING ENTHUSIASM INTO A RESOURCE I	  have	  worked	  to	  demonstrate	  two	  facets	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  for	  a	  study	  of	  ‘how	  to’	  texts.	  First,	  the	  experiential	  dimension	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’	  needs	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account	   to	   appreciate	   the	   way	   ‘know-­‐how’	   itself	   is	   not	  transmitted.	   Rather,	   the	   conditions	   of	   experience	   are	   presented	   so	   they	   can	   be	  reproduced	  by	  the	  reader	  or	  viewer	  of	   ‘how	  to’	  texts	  who	  can	  then	  develop	  ‘know-­‐how’	   through	   their	   own	   bodies.	   Second,	   the	   ‘how	   to’	   text	   serves	   as	   a	   primer	   of	  experience	  for	  the	  development	  of	   ‘know-­‐how’	  in	  an	  affective	  sense.	  I	  have	  focused	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primarily	   on	   the	  way	   contemporary	   consumer	   technologies	   are	   ‘black	   boxed’	   and	  indicated	  that	  one	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  ‘how	  to’	  text	  is	  prepare	  readers	  or	  viewers	  for	   ‘opening’	   black-­‐boxed	   socio-­‐technologies.	   There	   are	   many	   other	   ways	   that	  contemporary	   consumers	  are	  mobilised	   into	  action	  and	   this	  means	   thinking	  about	  ‘how	  to’	  texts	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  specialist	  or	  enthusiast	  media.	  The	   weird	   ontological	   character	   of	   a	   ‘challenge’	   means	   that	   anyone—an	  enthusiastic	  novice	  through	  to	  an	  ‘old	  hand’—can	  mobilise	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  same	  problematic	   represented	   by	   the	   challenge,	   albeit	   actualised	   in	   sometimes	   very	  different	   ways	   and	   varying	   degrees	   of	   ‘success’.	   The	   creative	   industries	   turn	   this	  mobilising	   force	  of	   enthusiasm	   into	  a	   resource	  by	  valorising	   some	  challenges	  over	  others	   as	   worthy	   of	   mobilisation	   and	   organising	   cultural	   events	   that	   serve	   as	  conduits	   of	   experience	   for	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   ‘know-­‐how’.	   Joseph	   Pine	   and	   James	  Gilmore	   turned	   the	   experiential	   dimension	   of	   the	   service	   economy	   into	   a	   general	  commercial	  program	  in	  their	  best-­‐selling	  book	  The	  Experience	  Economy.70	  They	  gloss	  the	  ways	  businesses	  can	  exploit	  the	  labour	  of	  consumers	  by	  developing	  a	  model	  of	  commoditising	   feedback	   premised	   on	   the	   on-­‐going	   ‘mass	   customisation’	   of	  commodities	  by	  consumers.71	  What	  they	  are	  actually	  describing	  is	  the	  extraction	  of	  surplus	  value	  from	  the	  creative	  labour	  of	  consumers.	  	  It	   is	   surprising	   that	   Pine	   and	   Gilmore	   do	   not	   dwell	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  media	   in	   modulating	   the	   affective	   dimensions	   of	   experience	   so	   as	   to	   not	   only	   be	  congruent	  with	  the	  enthusiasms	  of	  readers	  or	  viewers,	  but	  to	  also	  be	  congruent	  with	  the	   commercial	   imperatives	   of	   business.	   The	   anticipatory	   cycle	   of	   ‘hype’	   for	   new	  products	   has	   become	   a	   well-­‐known	   feature	   of	   many	   contemporary	   industries,	   in	  particular	  the	  computer	  and	  information	  technology	  sectors.	  Steven	  Jones	  dedicated	  a	   chapter	  of	   his	   book	  The	  Meaning	  of	  Video	  Games	   to	   exploring	   the	  phenomena	   in	  ‘Anticipating	   Spore’	   and	   notes	   the	   importance	   of	   such	   anticipatory	   practices	   for	  gaming	   fans.72	   More	   important	   to	   the	   commercial	   interests	   of	   the	   contemporary	  experience	   economy	   is	   the	   use	   of	   ‘custom	   media’	   to	   help	   shape	   consumer	  experience.	   Turning	   enthusiasm	   into	   a	   resource	   is	   a	   powerful	   tool	   for	   companies	  operating	  in	  this	  ‘experience	  economy’,	  but	  it	  requires	  a	  careful	  balance	  between	  the	  circulation	  of	  active	  and	  passive	  affects	  of	  enthusiasm.	  The	  successful	  harnessing	  of	  enthusiasm	  means	  that,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  participants	  in	  the	  culture	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	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for	   an	   experience	   they	   in	   part	   create	   through	   attendance,	   and	   in	   more	   elaborate	  examples	  actually	  produce	  the	  objects	  or	  practices	  that	  other	  participants	  consume.	  	  The	   collective-­‐individualising	   character	   of	   the	   contemporary	   experience	  economy	   has	   a	   problematic	   relationship	   to	   the	   necessities	   of	   the	   current	   political	  situation,	   where	   individual	   people,	   groups	   and	   nations	   are	   being	   challenged	   to	  respond	  to	  likely	  global	  ecological	  catastrophe.	  In	  the	  introduction	  I	  suggested	  that	  developing	   individualistic	   expertise	   in	   enthusiastic	   and	   often	   amateur	   forms	   of	  ‘know-­‐how’	   as	   compared	   to	   collective	   or	   social	   forms	   of	   everyday	   knowledge	  was	  one	  way	  to	  characterise	  the	  current	  composition	  of	  neoliberal	  power	  relations.	  How	  is	   it	  possible	   then	   to	  respond	  to	  collective	  problems	  when	   the	  mode	  of	  affirmative	  affective	  mobilisation	   is	   individualising	   by	   design?	  Wilson’s	  Robopocalypse	   is	   also	  interesting	  when	  compared	  to	  another	  recent	  post-­‐apocalyptic	  science-­‐fiction	  novel	  with	   a	   similar	   narrative	   structure,	  Max	  Brooks’	  World	  War	   Z.73	  Robopocalypse	   and	  
World	   War	   Z	   have	   different	   economies	   of	   knowledge	   in	   the	   ways	   ‘know-­‐how’	   is	  developed	  to	  respond	  to	  their	  respective	  apocalyptic	  threats	  (robots	  and	  zombies).	  
Robopocalypse	   is	  organised	  around	  valorising	   individualistic	  modes	  of	  engagement	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  the	  apocalyptic	  robot	  threat.	  I’ve	  already	  mentioned	  Lark	  Iron	  Cloud,	  but	   there	   is	   another	  narrative	   thread	  organised	  around	  a	   Japanese	   robotics	  engineer,	  Takeo	  Nomura,	  who	  adores	  his	  robotic	  android	  partner,	  Mikiko.	  Nomura	  divides	   the	   robots	   in	   those	   that	   have	   ‘good	   minds’	   and	   those	   that	   have	   (Archos-­‐controlled)	   ‘bad	  minds’.	  Mikiko	   has	   a	   ‘bad	  mind’	   and	   through	  Nomura’s	   efforts	   to	  ‘cleanse’	  her	  (it?)	  of	  Archos’	  control	  he	  learns	  how	  to	  cleanse	  the	  industrial	  robots	  at	  his	   factory	   workplace.	   The	   layering	   of	   masculine	   control	   (over	   technology,	   over	  gendered	  technology,	  over	  women)	  is	  a	  topic	  worth	  exploring	  elsewhere,	  but	  here	  I	  want	   to	  emphasise	   the	  way	  Nomura’s	   endeavours	  are	   framed	  as	  an	   individualistic	  struggle.	  World	  War	   Z	   documents	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   knowledge	   development	   (or	  ‘innovation’)	  whereby	  the	  surviving	  government	  authorities	  work	  (or,	  in	  some	  cases,	  fail)	   together	   so	   as	   to	   develop	   standardised	   ways	   of	   combatting	   zombies	  (standardised	  weapons,	   standardised	  military	  strategies	  and	  so	  on)	   in	   response	   to	  the	   apocalyptic	   zombie	   threat.	   Robopocalypse	   follows	   in	   a	   great	   tradition	   of	  personifying	  innovative	  development,	  where	  even	  the	  ‘villain’	  Archos	  is	  personified	  as	   a	   singular	   intelligence,	  while	   the	   personal	   dimension	   of	  World	  War	   Z	   is	   largely	  subsumed	   by	   the	   response	   required	   against	   the	   collective	   threat	   of	   mindless	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zombies.	   Brook’s	   novel	   is	   a	   follow	   up	   text	   from	   his	   2003	  Zombie	   Survival	   Guide.74	  Like	   Wilson’s	   ‘how	   to’	   texts	   about	   the	   robot	   apocalypse,	   Brooks	   covers	   zombie	  survival	   in	   amazing	   detail.	   An	   important	   difference	   is	   that	   Brooks	   advocates	   for	  
collective	   action	   at	   every	   level	   from	   individual	   survival	   to	   military	   strategies	   for	  eventually	   overcoming	   the	   zombie	   threat.	   This	   is	   summed	   up	   in	   the	   single	  command:	   ‘You	  should	  never	  go	  off	  alone.’75	  The	  pre-­‐personal	  collective	  dimension	  of	   enthusiasm,	   involving	   the	   transversal	   movement	   of	   affect	   across	   and	   through	  bodies,	   is	   subjectively	  experienced	  as	   it	   ‘develops’	   in	   the	  body,	  but	   I	   am	   indicating	  something	  else	  here	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  contingency	  and	  necessity	  with	   my	   brief	   example	   of	   Robopocalypse	   and	   World	   War	   Z.	   Collective	   action	   is	  necessary	   in	   the	   face	   of	   global	   ecological	   catastrophe,	   but	   are	  most	   people	   simply	  incapable	  of	  appreciating	  the	  collective	  dimension	  of	  the	  challenge?	  Everyday	  life	  in	  the	   experience	   economy	   is,	   in	   part,	   structured	   to	   enable	   consumers	   to	   passively	  enjoy	   their	   own	   enthusiasms,	   so	   the	   problem	   isn’t	   mobilising	   enthusiasm	   in	   a	  greater	  cohort	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  problem	  is	  how	  to	  turn	  this	  enthusiasm	  into	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  resource.	   —	  Glen	  Fuller	  completed	  his	  PhD	  in	  2007.	  In	  it,	  he	  investigated	  and	  problematised	  the	  relation	  between	  enthusiasm	  and	  niche	  or	  specialist	  media.	  From	  2008	  to	  2011	  he	  worked	   in	   the	  magazine	   industry	   in	   a	   number	   of	   different	   positions	   and	   has	   also	  worked	   freelance	   since	   2002.	  He	   is	   currently	   an	   assistant	   professor	   in	   Journalism	  and	  Communication,	  Faculty	  of	  Arts	  and	  Design,	  University	  of	  Canberra.	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